Anyone still remember Groupon?

I just did a guest lecture at a New School journalism class. While preparing for the class, I pulled the sad stock chart for GRPN (Groupon):

If you bought the hype in 2011, you'd have lost 70% of your investment ($25 to $7).

Given what we know today, it's hard for people to feel the hype that the media helped fuel in those days. As a reminder, here is the New York Times's David Pogue gushing about Groupon, just before its IPO: link. Pogue was one of many such commentators. 

Around that time, I had this response to the Groupon boosters. There was a gaping hole in the win-win-win story from the start. Retailers are giving up sure profit for the probability that the coupon-users are not dealseekers and would come back for repeat business, at a higher price.

This is related to my current concern about the so-called "gas price stimulus". The hit to the oil and gas sector is immediate and certain. The shift of spending to other sectors, and the associated "multiplier effects", is a probability of multiple events occurring in the future.

 

Comments

[Ken]

One way to see Groupon and similar schemes is as advertising. If you sell 200 discounted coupons and make a loss of $5 each then that is $1000 spent on advertising your business. If you don't get a $1000 worth of new customers then it has been a waste of money. I expect most businesses found that it only made sense if they could make a loss of $0. This is difficult or most likely impossible if Groupon is going to take half the payment, so effectivelyyou have 25% of the normal price which in the restaurant business just covers the raw food, not the kitchen and wait staff, and the more customers you have the more you need of these.

Short summary: you can't get away from the fundamentals. Either something is value for money or it isn't.

[Adam Schwartz]

I love it when people follow up on the outcomes of a prior post! I'm sure you're familiar with the work of Philip Tetlock and the dismal state of expert prediction. There's very little at stake for them when folks (as Pogue did) provide a prediction that doesn't come true. Of course, had Groupon gone the other way in terms of performance would the average person have written the follow-up? (something of a potential Texas Sharpshooter fallacy?)

Reviewing their recent 10K filing gives some insight that aligns with your argument about the counterfactual. Merchants are demanding better terms from Groupon instead of a 50/50 split and not continuing to make offers - all text not exactly jumping out in the filing, but it does ultimately show up in their stock price and net losses quarter over quarter.

Thanks for continuing to shine a light on flawed analytic thinking!

[junkcharts]

Ken: In a different post from the one I linked to, I compared the Groupon model to Restaurant Week. I think eventually, through a combination of targeting, restrictions, and creating tailor-made services for coupon users, it is possible to make the scheme work. But it is a niche business, not the world-conquering vision they were selling. In the case of Restaurant Week, I'm thinking about those prestigious restaurants that create specific low-cost menus for Restaurant Week clients, menus that reflect poorly on the quality of said establishments, indicating that they are not expecting return business.

Adam: Thanks for looking up their recent 10Ks.

[Ken]

I can't help feeling that they start off with a model that is optimised to make the potential profits look large, and the financial community are quite happy to be taken in by that, as that is what the newspaper etc buying public wants to hear. It is convenient for those involved in the start-up because they sell out leaving the investors to take a loss. Maybe some of these companies will be salvageable but probably they are so tainted that they will eventually go under. Next recession (coming to an economy near you soon) we will see who is swimming naked.